AUTHOR’S PROOF
UNCORRECTED PROOF
1
2 3
Hume on the Self 4
Alan Schwerin 5
67

8
Abstract In the Treatise Hume argues that a person is “nothing but a bundle of 9
perceptions”. But what precisely is the meaning of this bundle thesis of a person? In 10
my paper, an attempt is made to articulate two plausible interpretations of this 11
controversial view and to identify and evaluate a number of problems for this thesis 12
central that is central to Hume’s account of the self. 13
Keywords Hume . Self .Mind . Perceptions . Identity . Bundle theory . Ontology . 14
Conceptual scheme . Idea . Substance 15
16
When Hume prepares the way for his Treatise account of the self in the section “Of 17
personal identity”, he dispatches a rival view as manifestly contradictory and absurd. 18
His concise and bleak assessment of this alternative account of the self is due, in large 19
measure, to the conceptual scheme that Hume adopts early on in the Treatise in his 20
attempt to broaden and strengthen the science of human nature. His decision in the 21
very first section of the Treatise to introduce and promote the novel linguistic 22
framework that is founded on the notion of impressions enables Hume to detect 23
fundamental flaws in the views of other philosophers that they, apparently, are unable 24
to identify. Equally important, Hume’s conceptual scheme provides him with a new 25
conception of the self that from his point of view, appears to be robust and immune 26
from the challenges that beset the view of the mind that is promoted by his most 27
prominent rivals. So what is this view of the self that Hume enthusiastically intro- 28
duces in the Treatise? And is this theory, even with its commitment to the celebrated 29
impressions, any less defective than that defended by his rivals? This paper is an 30
attempt to throw light on both of these important issues. Take the first question. 31
Hume’s conception of the self is articulated most fully and directly in Section 6 of 32
the Treatise, in the section titled “Of personal identity.” While there are faint vestiges 33
of this conception elsewhere in the Treatise, most notably in his analysis in “Of the 34
Int Ontology Metaphysics
DOI 10.1007/s12133-012-0094-x
A. Schwerin (*)
Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ, USA
e-mail: aschweri@monmouth.edu
JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
AUTHOR’S PROOF
UNCORRECTED PROOF
immateriality of the soul”, it is Section 6 that contains the most complete expression 35
of Hume’s own view of the self. Not one to mince his words, Hume cuts to the chase 36
with a concise proposition: the self is a collection of perceptions. As he bluntly puts 37
it, we are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions.” (Treatise 252). 38
On the surface, this seems a straightforward statement: it appears to be precise and 39
readily verifiable. Unlike his rivals with their opaque view that the self is an 40
unchanging mysterious substance, when Hume maintains that we are constituted by 41
a set of changing perceptions, he is adopting a view of a person that appears to be 42
easier to test than that advocated by his rivals. For are these immediate and directly 43
accessible perceptions not more accessible than the alleged fictions proposed by his 44
rivals? And as perceptions, are nothing more than distinct and separable sensory 45
impressions, as far as Hume is concerned, questions on the nature of the self now 46
become distinctly decidable: confine the investigation to the directly accessible 47
impressions generated by the senses. So, if we view the self as nothing more than a 48
concatenation of diverse sensory impressions, each one of which is reputed to be 49
directly and unambiguously accessible—even though the set or collection of impres- 50
sions is (allegedly) constantly in flux—reliable knowledge of the self now becomes 51
attainable. And this, to a large extent is surely what the founders of the new science of 52
human nature are after. But is this inroad into the citadel of a human being as reliable 53
as Hume intimates it is? 54
Is Hume’s enthusiasm for his view of the self warranted? Hume has provided us 55
with his reasons for adopting this view on the self, due in large measure, to his 56
rejection of his rivals’ view of the self, with its commitment to mysterious immaterial 57
substances. But is Hume’s bundle thesis on the self, as it stands, true? More 58
fundamentally, what does it mean? Even if the thesis is true, the suggestion that a 59
complex person, who is capable of engaging in a diverse series of acts, such as falling 60
in love, becoming angry, being thoughtful, and of being self-conscious—to randomly 61
mention but a few activities that a person can perform—can be reduced to something 62
that is nothing more than a collection of discrete perceptions seems implausible, if not 63
far-fetched. This minimalist view of a person on the surface seems implausible, and 64
certainly does not appear to make sense. It certainly does not appear to do justice to 65
the myriad aspects of a person. Hume’s austere thesis on the self on the surface 66
appears similar to the suggestion that DaVinci’s Mona Lisa in the Louvre is nothing 67
more than blobs of pigment on a canvas. This bold thesis on a person, as succinct as it 68
is, gives rise to a number of important questions that ought to be considered before 69
any decision can be made on its viability. These are not straightforward questions to 70
deal with, as becomes apparent from even a cursory investigation of the theory and its 71
ramifications. We shall discover that Hume has unfortunately not helped us, or 72
himself, on these matters. For a careful investigation of his bundle thesis of the self 73
and its implications begs many questions that do not appear to be anticipated in the 74
Treatise. Neither the main text nor Hume’s critical appendix to the Treatise, in spite of 75
its forthrightness, says anything about these issues. His silence on these important 76
matters is most unfortunate, as I shall demonstrate below, as the lacunae seriously 77
compromise his view on the self. This suggests—or so I shall argue—contrary to 78
Hume’s assessment, that both the rival substance theory of the self and Hume’s 79
bundle theory of the self are beset with difficulties, some serious. While Hume might 80
have identified some possible shortcomings in the substance theory of the self, his 81
A. Schwerin
JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
AUTHOR’S PROOF
UNCORRECTED PROOF
own account appears to have its own set of problems. All of which begs the important 82
question on which theory has the least shortcomings. Naturally, we can begin to 83
consider this question only after we have determined the standing of Hume’s own 84
view on the self. For these reasons in this paper I shall restrict my exploration of 85
Hume’s bundle theory on the self and its potential problems and leave it to others to 86
weigh his innovative view against the more traditional substance theory of the self. So 87
what appears to be problematic with the thesis that a person is “nothing but a bundle 88
or collection of different perceptions”? 89
The view of the self that Hume vigorously promotes in the Treatise is not as 90
straightforward as its author intimates it is. While his analysis in “Of personal 91
identity” leaves one with the distinct impression that Hume is convinced that he 92
has found the truth where the self is concerned, the confident tone of his proclama- 93
tions belies many troubling issues. Unfortunately, none of these potentially fatal 94
concerns are even mentioned, let alone dealt with by the intrepid Scotsman.1 What 95
might they be? A few of these questions emerge if we expand on and make more 96
explicit some of the strands of Hume’s central thesis statement. My modest modifi- 97
cation here to his initial terse expression of the bundle theory of the self, while still 98
true to the essentials of his position, makes some of the problematic aspects of his 99
thesis more apparent: 100
Statement One: A person is a bundle of perceptions and nothing else. 101
How ought we to understand this statement? While the reasons for this thesis 102
might initially appear plausible, encouraging Hume to explore the motivation of 103
philosophers for adopting their (discredited) rival substantial theory of the self, at 104
the end of the section “Of personal identity” we are still left wondering how he wants 105
us to read his thesis that is the cornerstone of his analysis of the newly emerging 106
philosophical conception of the self. In the first place, questions arise on the logic of 107
the statement. Is it correct to view Statement One as a categorical statement, without 108
any qualifying clauses? The uncompromising declarative sentences that Hume relies 109
on to express his thoughts on the self in the main text of the Treatise, along with the 110
confident, if not brash tone of the writing in the early part of the section “Of personal 111
identity” certainly leaves one with the impression that this is his intent. A person 112
definitely is, in Hume’s considered view, a set of perceptions. Period. There are no 113
exceptions or mitigating qualifications to this provocative statement. We either take it 114
or leave it at that: as Hume sees it, we need not concern ourselves with any potentially 115
compromising reservations where his thesis on the self is concerned. As he does not 116
hedge his statement with any qualifying clauses it seems plausible to assume that the 117
statement on his own view on the self ought to be viewed as a categorical statement, 118
free of any encumbering mitigating conditions. However, there is another, more 119
nuanced way to read his thesis. 120
1 One might object that trailblazers are most unlikely to draw attention to problems associated with their
innovative ideas. This rejoinder strikes me as moot when one takes into account the scathing criticisms
leveled by Hume against his rivals. As a philosopher more than willing to wield a critical ax against his
intellectual opposition, Hume is obliged to acknowledge potential shortcomings in his own views:
something he does not do in the section “Of personal identity.” And when he does come clean in the
appendix and acknowledge that there are problems with his account of the self, the problems that he
identifies there do not concern the status of his theory on the self but concern its justification.
Hume on the Self
JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
AUTHOR’S PROOF
UNCORRECTED PROOF
The uncompromising, authoritative tone of the language Hume draws on to 121
articulate his thesis notwithstanding, it can be shown that a more appropriate inter- 122
pretation of Hume’s articulation of his bundle thesis of the self is to regard his 123
statement as a tentative expression of his thoughts. On this reading, the statement is 124
little more than a hypothesis, subject to the standard vicissitudes of experience. While 125
perhaps not commanding the same level of attention that the thesis could engender if 126
read categorically, this interpretation of the expression of the bundle theory of the self 127
still warrants the serious scrutiny of individuals interested in knowing what a person 128
is. Naturally, Hume’s statement on the self on this softer interpretation must still be 129
regarded as an earnest contribution to the science of human nature, fully entitled to 130
systematic consideration by both philosophers and the vulgar. But the assertive and 131
confident aura that initially accompanied Hume’s terse statement on the self, on this 132
alternative interpretation, is now more restrained and cautious. 133
While Hume, unfortunately, does not provide us with any direct textual assistance 134
on this important matter of interpretation, a case can be made that the second option is 135
the more plausible of the two options that I have identified here. The suggestion that 136
we ought to view Statement One hypothetically is consistent with the observation that 137
the analysis in the section “Of personal identity” makes much of evidence. Sensory 138
evidence, apparently constitutes the Achilles heel of Hume’s rivals’ substance theory 139
of the self, as far as he is concerned, enabling him to detect the contradictions and 140
absurdities in their position. And it is evidence from the senses that Hume draws on in 141
order to provide the support that he needs for his own thesis. Immediately after 142
presenting his provocative bundle thesis on the self he alludes to the observable facts 143
that he views as providing the necessary support for his philosophical thesis on the self: 144
Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our 1456
thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and 147
faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, 148
which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. (Treatise 252–3) 149
This is an important component of Hume’s strategy in his analysis of the problems 1501
concerning the self. As he intimates, his statement on the self is not a casual 152
suggestion, but a serious proposal motivated by a consideration of various observable 153
facts and most importantly, constrained by these facts. Furthermore, the thesis does 154
not depend on the existence of mysterious fictions, as does the discredited substance 155
theory of his rivals. Instead, the bundle thesis on the self requires down-to-earth 156
sensory evidence for its verification: namely, eminently accessible perceptions that 157
we are all presumed to possess. Furthermore, in his view, not only is there evidence 158
for his thesis, there is a lot of it. As it happens there is a great deal of the required 159
evidence that is supportive of his innovative view on the self. Each one of us 160
possesses this evidence in abundance, namely in the form of our perceptions. Finally, 161
this evidence comes from a dependable source, namely the senses. As Hume inti- 162
mates, this abundant evidence available to all of us proves that his bundle thesis on 163
the self is true. All of which suggests, as I see it, that Hume regards his bundle thesis 164
on the self, not as a categorical statement free of qualifications, but as a plausible, 165
scientific hypothesis beholden to the world of voluminous diverse sensory evidence. 166
Unfortunately, this interpretation, if correct, gives rise to additional difficult ques- 167
tions, none of which have been anticipated, let alone dealt with by Hume. 168
A. Schwerin
JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
AUTHOR’S PROOF
UNCORRECTED PROOF
I have argued that the interpretation of Hume’s bundle thesis on the self as a 169
scientific hypothesis is plausible. If correct, this reading gives rise to a number of 170
challenging problems for Hume. Here are a few of the more pressing issues calling 171
for further attention if my proposal holds any water. To make matters manageable I 172
shall first list the issues that strike me as most pressing and then consider each 173
separately. Five issues stand out: 174

1. Biased assessment of the evidence: Hume appears to be very selective in what he 175
   accepts as evidence for his thesis. He fails to consider evidence that could falsify 176
   his thesis on the self. 177
2. Fallacious generalization from the evidence: his personal experiences serve as the 178
   basis of his generalization for all mankind, with the exception of those allegedly 179
   misguided metaphysicians who endorse the rival substance theory of the self. 180
3. Contradictory evidence: when Hume gathers evidence to support his view, his net 181
   ensnares material that appears to both confirm and (unbeknownst to him) refute 182
   his thesis. 183
4. Unintelligible evidence: the conception of the evidence that Hume alludes to 184
   appears to be difficult if not impossible to comprehend. 185
5. Unnecessary evidence: the search for evidence for his view on the self can be 186
   shown to be moot. 187
   Consider the first suggestion from the list above that Hume is selective in the 188
   evidence that he gathers. 189
   As we have seen, when Hume presents his bundle thesis on the self, he delights in 190
   pointing to the evidence that he has found to support his view. From his perspective, 191
   this evidence is incontrovertible. In many respects, Hume seems to be correct on this 192
   score. There can be no doubt that the mind has numerous, different perceptions that 193
   are in constant flux: 194
   The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their 1956
   appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of 197
   postures and situations. (Treatise 253) 198
   But appeals to evidence—as with Hume’s references here to his changing percep- 120909
   tions—in support of any thesis cannot establish beyond a doubt that that proposition 201
   is certain and absolutely true: at best, the thesis can be regarded as probably true, 202
   perhaps even as highly probable. And inductive probable propositions, even those 203
   with high degrees of probability, are nothing more than tentative hypotheses mani- 204
   festing a preponderance one way or another to some truth value. That is to say, these 205
   hypothetical propositions are conjectures that require their advocates to weigh the 206
   evidence either for or against their position. The evidence needs to be carefully 207
   assayed in an attempt to either confirm or refute the hypothesis. Now, it would be 208
   naïve to assume that if a thesis can be viewed as a true hypothesis by virtue of the fact 209
   that there is some evidence in its favor, there cannot simultaneously be contrary 210
   evidence that, under the appropriate circumstances, could undermine the thesis— 211
   thereby serving as a potential, if not actual, refutation of the thesis. It is thus 212
   unrealistic to take it for granted that all of the evidence that can be gathered that 213
   pertains to a thesis will automatically serve to confirm it. Surely some of the evidence 214
   that can be accumulated by a conscientious objective investigator is not likely to 215
   Hume on the Self
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   support the thesis. But Hume does not even entertain the possibility that his bundle 216
   thesis on the self is false. As far as he is concerned, it is a true thesis that has the edge 217
   over his rivals in that it at least is supported by independent evidence. But what 218
   reasons do we have from Hume for thinking that there is no negative evidence, i.e., 219
   evidence that is incompatible with his view on the self? Surely there is some evidence 220
   that can refute his bundle thesis of the self? Unfortunately, he does not provide any 221
   reasons for assuming that his thesis can only be true. Without some discussion from 222
   him on this important issue we are left with the distinct impression that Hume is not 223
   willing to concede that he is wrong about the self. And when we factor in what 224
   appears to be an arrogant tone to the articulation of his view on the self, we are 225
   tempted to wonder whether Hume’s uncompromising theory of the self is little better 226
   than the outburst of some radical irrational thinker wildly speculating on the nature of 227
   a person. So Hume’s reliance on highly selective evidence in support of his theory of 228
   the self, while commendatory to some extent, can be seen as indicative of a biased 229
   mind.2 230
   Unfortunately, even the evidence that Hume presents in favor of his bundle thesis 231
   on the self appears to be less than satisfactory. Some of it actually threatens to 232
   undermine his position. As I shall demonstrate shortly, the evidence that Hume 233
   provides us for his theory on the self can be viewed as a refutation of his view on 234
   the self. Before we explore this issue on the potentially compromising nature of the 235
   evidence that Hume has gathered, there are two other aspects of his reliance on 236
   evidence that call for attention: the one more pressing than the other. Take the less 237
   problematic issue. The evidence garnered by Hume is insufficient to establish his 238
   thesis. 239
   To put it politely, the sensory evidence that Hume has gathered in the Treatise for 240
   his bundle thesis on the self is somewhat limited: a limitation that gives rise to a 241
   number of interesting problems. The evidence that Hume collects happens to be 242
   culled from his own private world, i.e., he is drawing on the operations of his own 243
   mind and body to formulate and confirm a thesis on the self that he clearly intends to 244
   extrapolate beyond himself. Without direct access to the minds of others, with their 245
   inaccessible perceptions, the best that Hume can do under the circumstances is draw 246
   on his own experiences. Operating on the unexamined assumption that his private 247
   world of perceptions is fundamentally similar to that of everyone else—while simul- 248
   taneously assuming that he is not the sole constituent of some solipsistic world—and 249
   assuming that these perceptions are produced by organs that operate in basically 250
   similar ways between individuals, Hume takes it for granted that what applies to him 251
   applies to the rest of mankind. For instance, Hume makes explicit reference to eyes 252
   that produce perceptions that possess definite, yet fundamentally similar, character- 253
   istics. But are our sense organs alike, operating in similar ways, producing similar 254
   perceptions? Some studies suggest not. Numerous studies have shown that percep- 255
   tions are not similarly produced. For example, individuals who suffer from synes- 256
   thesia perceive colors where others perceive mere letters and numerals. The contents 257
   2 Hume appears to subscribe to a naïve view of science, according to which scientists need merely look for
   evidence that confirms their theories. Many critics of this model of science, most notably Karl Popper, point
   out that the failure to actively seek refutation instances to test one’s theory encourages the researcher to
   become highly selective in determining the status of the theory at hand. (See Popper, “Conjectures and
   Refutations” on this issue.)
   A. Schwerin
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   of our perceptual worlds can be very different, as can the processes that give rise to 258
   the contents of these worlds. There is great variety where the nature and production of 259
   our perceptions are concerned. So the attempt to inductively generalize from one 260
   mental world and its contents to other mental worlds is fraught with difficulties. What 261
   Hume says about his world of changing perceptions might not be representative of the 262
   perceptual worlds of others. Yet he trades on the unexamined assumption that these 263
   perceptual worlds are fundamentally similar. Hence his remark that “I may venture to 264
   affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of 265
   different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and 266
   are in a perpetual flux and movement.” (Treatise 252, my emphasis). But what 267
   warrant has Hume to assume that his mind is similar to that of the rest of mankind? 268
   He clearly needs to argue for this pillar of his analysis and not merely accept it as 269
   problem-free. Without the necessary ancillary premise/s to support his generalization, 270
   the limited evidence that Hume has gathered from his own personal world proves to 271
   be insufficient to support his universal bundle thesis of the self. 272
   The limited evidence that Hume provides for his thesis on the self faces yet another 273
   problem. It does not appear to be internally consistent. In his enthusiastic presentation 274
   of his provocative account of the self, Hume inadvertently provides us with 275
   conflicting evidence. While some of the evidence that he provides in the section 276
   “Of personal identity” appears to confirm his bundle thesis on the self, unfortunately 277
   there is also evidence in this section that appears to undermine this very thesis, in that 278
   it seems not to be entirely compatible with, if not contradictory to his views on 279
   perceptions and the self. Let me explain. 280
   As we have seen, Hume makes much of the sensory evidence available to him in 281
   his analysis. Not only does he use this sensory evidence against his rivals with their 282
   substance theory of the self, he depends on it to support his own bundle thesis on the 283
   self. As he sees it, we all live in discrete perceptual worlds whose content is 284
   constantly changing. But where do our forever fluctuating perceptions come from? 285
   Hume does not hesitate to inform us: from our eyes. In the midst of his references to 286
   his ephemeral perceptions, he quite openly refers to body parts—eyes, and their 287
   sockets. And these body parts are presumably more stable—that is to say, less 288
   transitory—than the constantly changing perceptions. For immediately after boldly 289
   informing us that the bulk of “mankind…are nothing but a bundle or collection of 290
   different perceptions”, Hume informs us about the origin of these perceptions: “Our 291
   eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions.” (Treatise 252). 292
   Thanks to (physical) eyes that are relatively unchanging in (physical) eye-sockets that 293
   are similarly stable, streams of different perceptions can be generated. But are these 294
   similar types of entities? The textual evidence from the Treatise suggests that Hume 295
   regards perceptions and parts of the body as fundamentally different types of entities: 296
   well at least as far as his explicit proposals in the section “Of personal identity” goes. 297
   But if Hume is willing to acknowledge the existence of two mutually exclusive types 298
   of entities where persons are concerned, and quite prepared to refer to both sets of 299
   (different types) of entities without any reservations, a fundamental question arises: 300
   why single out the one set of entities over the other in determining the ontological 301
   scheme that best applies to persons? In short, why identify a person with a set of (non- 302
   physical) perceptions, when physical entities apparently are equally accessible? 303
   Rather than, for instance, rely on a collection of physical objects to serve as the 304
   Hume on the Self
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   referents for the definiens, Hume focuses exclusively on perceptions. Why? Let us 305
   take a closer look at his characterization of perceptions and entities from alternative 306
   ontological schemes in the section “Of personal identity” in an attempt to understand 307
   a possible justification for Hume’s preference for perceptions where the explication of 308
   a person is concerned. My hope is that an attempt at reconstructing a clear under- 309
   standing of his conception of the relationship between perceptions and these alterna- 310
   tive entities will enable us to appreciate the likely grounds for his preference for 311
   perceptions when defining a person.3 312
   With his bundle thesis on the self, Hume is clearly exhibiting an explicit commit- 313
   ment to the ontology of perceptions at the expense of other all other ontologies. For 314
   instance, his bundle thesis on the self that is centered exclusively on perceptions 315
   implicitly excludes any commitment to the radically different ontologies of physical 316
   objects and minds. Nevertheless, Hume is more than willing to make reference to the 317
   entities from these alternative ontologies. In the section “Of personal identity”, 318
   numerous unrestrained references are made to entities from ontologies that exclude 319
   perceptions. No mention is made of any problems with the references to the denizens 320
   of these alternative ontologies. And as we might expect, none of the problems raised 321
   by these alternative ontologies are even hinted at, let alone explored by Hume. As a 322
   matter of fact, he not only draws on these alternative ontologies when promoting his 323
   bundle thesis on the self, he subsequently proceeds to rely heavily on these different 324
   ontological schemes in his explication of the notion of identity.4 But the various 325
   ontological schemes that Hume is drawing on in his analysis of the self are not 326
   entirely compatible. A case can be made that they are actually mutually exclusive. So 327
   the evidence that Hume calls on in support of his bundle thesis on the self can be 328
   viewed as incompatible, if not contradictory. This is a potential problem for Hume 329
   that if not resolved can seriously weaken, if not undermine his philosophical view that 330
   a person is nothing but a bundle of perceptions. 331
   To understand Hume’s preference for the ontological scheme founded on percep- 332
   tions we need to have a reasonably clear grasp of his view on perceptions. While 333
   much of the Treatise is devoted to an analysis of perceptions, there are a number of 334
   useful remarks on perceptions in his arguments on the self that prove helpful here. A 335
   revealing and invaluable insight into Hume’s view on the nature of perceptions and 336
   his commitment to the ontology of perceptions where attempts to construct a viable 337
   theory of the self are concerned can be gleaned from an investigation of the theater 338
   analogy that he uses to explain the operation and nature of the self. We need to take a 339
   closer look at this famous analogy from the Treatise as it contains the key to many of 340
   the questions that have been raised above. As I shall attempt to demonstrate an 341
   analysis of this analogy will help us to better appreciate Hume’s argument for his 342
   view of the self, and most importantly here, can assist us in our attempt to resolve 343
   what appears to be a problem with the incompatibility of the evidence for Hume’s 344
   provocative thesis on the self. 345
   3 Is this the justification that Hume would use had he to explore this issue explicitly? It is difficult to say
   with any precision how Hume would respond to the problems that I am alluding to here. For this reason it is
   prudent to couch the suggestions here as speculative proposals.
   4 Might this be a case of Hume wanting his cake and eating it at the same time? The analysis that follows
   will hopefully throw a little light on this issue.
   A. Schwerin
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   When Hume outlines his provocative bundle thesis on the self, he draws on a 346
   simile to help illustrate his views. This is the comparison of the mind with a theater: 347
   The mind is a kind of theater, where several perceptions successively make their 3489
   appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of 350
   postures and situations. (Treatise 253) 351
   The evocative perspective introduced into the analysis with this analogy serves a 3523
   useful purpose for Hume, assisting him in his attempt to drive home both the extent of 354
   the dynamism of the mind and our inability to comprehend it. However, as with all 355
   analogies, the comparison of the mind to a theater carries with it various restrictions 356
   that Hume is adamant that we acknowledge and enforce. The reservations that Hume 357
   articulates with respect to his analogy are most revealing in that they provide us with 358
   an invaluable insight into the reasons for his preference for perceptions when 359
   attempting to construct a theory of the self. With a clearer understanding of his views 360
   on the virtues of perceptions, we will be able to better appreciate his insistence on the 361
   priority of perceptions in his search for a viable theory of the self. I believe that this 362
   will have the added benefit of putting us in the position to resolve the potentially fatal 363
   problem of the incompatibility of Hume’s evidence for his bundle thesis on the self. 364
   As useful as the theater analogy might be, Hume urges us not to read too much into 365
   it. In particular, we are strongly advised not to assume that the mind is governed by 366
   the same constraints that apply to other entities: 367
   The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive 3689
   perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion 370
   of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it 371
   is compos’d. (Treatise 253) 372
   Unlike other entities, such as physical objects that presumably can be located 3734
   spatially, perceptions are paradoxically beset with a serious shortcoming: in Hume’s 375
   view it is not possible to determine their location. As useful as perceptions might be 376
   for the investigator who is attempting to construct a viable account of the self, the 377
   arena in which these perceptions are presumably located proves difficult if not 378
   impossible to unearth and explore. What accounts for this difficulty, one might 379
   wonder? As Hume sees it, the locale for the perceptions is impossible to comprehend. 380
   But this shortcoming is not fatal in his view, compelling us to fundamentally modify 381
   our understanding of the mind. No. More specifically, we need not eliminate our 382
   assumption that there is a location for the vital perceptions that allegedly constitute 383
   us. Nor are we required to go further and possibly give up any reliance on percep- 384
   tions. These would be two (unnecessarily) extreme responses to the realization that 385
   the location of our perceptions is unknowable. For the failure on our part to under- 386
   stand where the perceptions are, as he sees it, does not entail that the perceptions are 387
   not located somewhere. Perceptions apparently do have a location, intimates Hume 388
   and this location is composed of something or other: the problem is that both the 389
   location and its nature are shrouded in mystery. The location and nature of the 390
   mind or self that contains our perceptions for Hume just happens to lie beyond 391
   our intellectual grasp: “nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where 392
   these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos’d.” (Treatise 393
   253, my emphasis). So we have perceptions—actually, many of them, according to 394
   Hume on the Self
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   Hume—and they presumably do exist in a location (i.e., the self), but apparently we 395
   are unable to conceive of this location and equally lack the means to understand what 396
   the location might be like. 397
   This is puzzling. Surely Hume does not want to expose himself to the charge that 398
   his account of the self is founded on an unintelligible, if not contradictory foundation? 399
   With its commitment to intelligible perceptions that allegedly are confined to an 400
   unintelligible realm it certainly begins to look as though the foundation of his bundle 401
   thesis on the self is fatally flawed. For the conception of evidence that Hume alludes 402
   to in support of his bundle thesis on the self appears to be difficult, if not impossible 403
   to comprehend. On the one hand, Hume wants us to accept that there can be little 404
   doubt that perceptions as a matter of fact do exist. Furthermore, we are apparently 405
   able to distinguish between these existing entities—that is to say, we are able to 406
   determine the nature of each of the separate perceptions and to compare them with 407
   their neighbors. So perceptions are thought to be comprehensible. But on the other 408
   hand, for some reason that is unfortunately unexplained by Hume, we are warned that 409
   we are unable to determine the location, let alone the nature of the location in which 410
   these perceptions exist. This inability is not a mere minor inconvenience, as Hume 411
   sees it, but a fundamental shortcoming, due in large part, or so it seems, to failings on 412
   our part. Our conceptual apparatus, or so it seems, is reputably ill-equipped to 413
   unfathom the location and nature of the venue in which our accessible perceptions 414
   interact. So our intelligible perceptions are reputably located in an unintelligible self. 415
   What accounts for this discrepancy? 416
   While the text is unfortunately not explicit on this important point, it seems 417
   reasonable to conclude that for Hume we are faced with an insurmountable hurdle 418
   when we attempt to explore the location of our allegedly comprehensible perceptions: 419
   we cannot even conceive of their location. For we do not understand what the mind is 420
   and are equally ignorant of its constitution. Both of these issues lie beyond our 421
   comprehension. As Hume (reluctantly?) puts it, while we are intimately aware of 422
   the great variety of activities engaged in by our perceptions, and can study these 423
   perceptions closely and monitor their activity, we unfortunately do not possess even 424
   “the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented…” (Treatise 425
   253, my emphasis). In short, as we do not possess the requisite idea of the mind we 426
   are unable to determine either the location of the diverse perceptual activity we are 427
   well aware of or the nature of this location.5 But with perceptions this is not the case. 428
   As Hume sees it, perceptions serve as the paragon entities where comprehensibil- 429
   ity is concerned. They are immanently accessible, distinguishable, and scrutable. 430
   These prove to be highly desirable properties. By virtue of these features of percep- 431
   tions investigators interested in constructing a useful and accurate conception of a 432
   person can precisely determine the constitution of the bundles of perceptions that 433
   characterize our experiences. This invaluable insight into our perceptions has addi- 434
   tional benefits. In the first place, access to the scrutable perceptions enables the 435
   investigator to determine with precision that the bundles of perceptions change, 436
   i.e., the composition of the collection of perceptions alters. In the second place, the 437
   5 From this, it follows that our willingness to talk about the mind and its nature belies a fundamental
   problem that we ought to acknowledge—in this instance, that we literally do not know what we are
   attempting to talk about.
   A. Schwerin
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   rate of change can be determined in broad terms. Thirdly, the frequency of the change 438
   can be monitored. It is because perceptions are so accessible and distinguishable that 439
   we apparently are able to determine that our perceptions exist as bundles “of different 440
   perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a 441
   perpetual flux and movement.” (Treatise 252) 442
   Consider this example that I think illustrates Hume’s view on the three attributes of 443
   perceptions that strike him as especially appealing. This example also brings home 444
   the incongruous nature of his views on the distinction between the self and its 445
   perceptions. When our clothes are washed—whether by us or someone else—we 446
   can determine what is in the machine and how the machine has been operated. Our 447
   knowledge of the contents of the machine and of its operation is fairly substantial. In 448
   the first place, we can determine the composition of the bundles of washing that have 449
   been placed in the washing machine: for instance, we can determine whether or not 450
   the delicate fabrics have been placed together, while hardier outfits have been inserted 451
   separately. Secondly, the rate of washing of the various batches can be monitored 452
   accurately: for instance, we can tell how long the whites have been in the wash as 453
   opposed to the time taken to wash our athletic outfits. Finally, it is possible to monitor 454
   the frequency of washing of the clothes: perhaps this week we wash each day for an 455
   hour for each session, while next week we wash every alternative day, for a mere 456
   20 min each time. As Hume sees it, we have a comparable facility with our 457
   perceptions. 458
   Hume suggests that we have direct access to and an unencumbered command of 459
   our perceptions. As with the bundles of washing in my example, investigators who 460
   are intent on exploring the contents of the mind can do so with a high degree of 461
   success. This is in large part due to the fact that the nature of the activities engaged in 462
   by our perceptions can be determined precisely, in his view. Given that the contents of 463
   the mind are all “different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and 464
   may be separately consider’d, and may exist separately” (Treatise 252) it seems 465
   reasonable to assume—as Hume does—that investigators who study the various acts 466
   that can be performed by their perceptions are able to construct fairly accurate 467
   accounts of the activities observed. 468
   But where the mind or self itself is concerned, a serious hurdle needs to be 469
   traversed: an obstacle that proves to be insurmountable. Unfortunately we lack any 470
   understanding of the location in which these scrutable perceptions are “housed”. To 471
   put it somewhat crudely: as with the operation of the washing machine, we can 472
   determine the configuration of the contents and operations of the mind. But unlike the 473
   washing machine, the location of the mind proves elusive. Without even a “distant 474
   notion of the place” where the perceptions act, our understanding of the mind is 475
   seriously compromised. Or so we might think. To bypass what might appear to be a 476
   fundamental obstacle, and to preserve his commitment to perceptions inviolate, 477
   Hume resorts to an ingenious tactic: he identifies the mind with its perceptions. 478
   The accessibility of our perceptions entails that they are scrutable. As we have 479
   seen, this is a highly prized characteristic of perceptions, as far as Hume is concerned. 480
   But the mind does not appear to be scrutable. Without even a faint understanding of 481
   the mind itself—as opposed to an understanding of its contents, namely its percep- 482
   tions—the location of the (attractively scrutable) perceptions cannot be studied. This 483
   could prove to be a serious stumbling block in the new science of human nature. To 484
   Hume on the Self
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   cite an analogous situation: ichthyologists interested in the carp have much to gain 485
   from the study of the environment in which these fish breed and survive. An account 486
   of the carp that leaves out an investigation of its particular surroundings is therefore 487
   incomplete and likely misleading. So the inability to systematically explore the 488
   environment in which our important perceptions exist could seriously undermine 489
   the value of the contributions of researchers interested in learning about the mind. 490
   However, if the mind can be identified with its perceptions the apparent inscrutability 491
   of the mind can be shown to be little more than a trifling issue in the search for a 492
   complete understanding of the mind and its contents. So it comes as no surprise to 493
   find that Hume presents his identity thesis immediately after his deflationary remarks 494
   on the scrutability of the mind. Having warned us against speculating on the nature of 495
   the mind and its location, while simultaneously applauding the virtues of perceptions, 496
   Hume asserts that the mind is composed of perceptions, and only perceptions: “They 497
   are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind.” (Treatise 253, my 498
   emphasis). While we lack any understanding of the location of the perceptions, this 499
   shortcoming ought not to concern us: our presumably extensive knowledge of the 500
   perceptions and their activities more than compensates for the lacuna. Having 501
   identified the mind with its perceptions, the knowledge that we have of perceptions 502
   more than compensates for our initial ignorance of the mind itself. But this is not to 503
   say that the mind cannot be known. The initial, possibly deflationary realization that 504
   the mind is inscrutable ought to be tempered by the insight that the mind happens to 505
   be its contents. So there is a way out of the conundrum, as Hume sees it. Hume’s 506
   thesis that postulates the identification of the mind with its perceptions carries with it 507
   a distinct epistemological advantage over the view of his rivals with their commit- 508
   ment to a (mysterious) substantial self with its perceptions: knowledge of the mind is 509
   now possible, as far as Hume is concerned. So individual minds can be known—but 510
   unfortunately only known indirectly—by virtue of the logical connection between 511
   minds and their accessible contents, i.e., their scrutable perceptions. Once we realize 512
   that minds are their perceptions—that they are one and the same—the investigation 513
   into these minds, or selves, can continue unabated. And in the process, a broad 514
   understanding of minds in general will hopefully emerge. With Hume’s identity 515
   thesis, there now appears to be light at the end of the tunnel. What initially appeared 516
   to be a frustrating insurmountable hurdle is thus to be viewed as a mere bump in the 517
   road towards a more robust, scientific understanding of a person. 518
   This identification of the mind with its perceptions inaugurates a major transition 519
   in Hume’s discourse on the self. The section “Of personal identity” opens with a 520
   severe critical flourish intended to expose the alleged shortcomings of the traditional 521
   account of the self. In this opening section, the substance theory of the self is 522
   subjected to a relentless attack from Hume. Given its broad appeal to both philoso- 523
   phers and the vulgar it seems unlikely that any substitute account of the mind will 524
   pass muster with supporters of the substance theory of the self. Can there be another 525
   account of the self that is as attractive as the popular received view? Perhaps not. 526
   However, it turns out that all is not lost. Hume’s blistering criticisms of his rivals 527
   serves as a somber backdrop to his more optimistic positive account of the self, 528
   assisting him in his attempt to sharply contrast the staid, opaque, and mysterious 529
   entrenched metaphysical view of the self with the more enlightened, straightforward, 530
   and scientific account. So when Hume turns to his own alternative understanding of 531
   A. Schwerin
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   the issue on the self, he injects what he clearly assumes is a healthy dose of 532
   constructive insight into the analysis. As I see it, his suggestion that we accept his 533
   identity thesis on the mind ought to be seen in this light. For with this identification, 534
   knowledge unencumbered by the specter of questionable speculations on the inac- 535
   cessible substantial mind or self now becomes possible. This desirable outcome is not 536
   possible with the established conception of the self. But we need to accept that this at 537
   best is an indirect inroad into knowledge of the mind, or self. As such, this indirect 538
   knowledge will be less certain than that that had initially been sought by investigators 539
   into the mind. Nevertheless, one might console oneself with the thought that a little 540
   knowledge is better than none. But is the mitigated optimism endemic to this inroad 541
   into the self through an investigation of its perceptions warranted? Perhaps not, for 542
   reasons that I need to explain. 543
   The suggestion that a mind consists exclusively of its perceptions is bold and 544
   ingenious. However, it begs a few fundamental questions that give rise to responses 545
   that can undermine this innovative proposal from Hume. Unless these questions are 546
   dealt with adequately, it seems that Hume’s identity thesis and more broadly his 547
   account of the self is likely to falter. More pointedly, the bold thesis that the mind can, 548
   and ought to be identified with its perceptions can be viewed as an unintelligible 549
   thesis. And if this damning indictment holds, the search for evidence for the thesis is 550
   moot. All of which would raise serious questions about the status of the so-called 551
   bundle thesis itself. While the suggestion from Hume that a person is “nothing but a 552
   bundle of perceptions” gives rise to a number of difficult issues, there are two 553
   challenging aspects of this thesis that strike me as especially problematic. 554
   In the first place, there is what we can call the ownership problem: can we be 555
   certain that the set of perceptions that we are investigating belongs to a specific 556
   individual? More pointedly, how do we ensure that an investigation of the contents of 557
   a particular mind can be regarded as representative of that mind, and not of some 558
   other mind? What is it about an individual’s perceptions that mark them as hers, and 559
   not as belonging to someone else? Hume does not say anything on this important 560
   issue. If direct knowledge of minds is not independently obtainable, as Hume insists, 561
   the proposal that we work with substitutes, such as the perceptions that belong to a 562
   person, poses a serious problem for the researcher. As accessible as these perceptions 563
   might prove to be, the investigation of an individual’s perceptions on their own 564
   cannot determine whose perceptions are being considered. As Hume is not willing 565
   to countenance any other entities in his definition of a person investigators intent on 566
   learning about an individual’s mind have nothing else to rely on in their research 567
   other than the dispossessed perceptions. Nothing but these perceptions without any 568
   manifest affiliation are permitted to serve as candidates for the investigator exploring 569
   the mind, in Hume’s view. Given these tight restraints facing the researcher into the 570
   self, surely something needs to be said about the problem facing researchers who 571
   attempt to associate or connect a person’s (reputably knowable) perceptions with their 572
   (reputably unknowable) mind. Unfortunately, Hume is silent on this important issue. 573
   A second and arguably more serious problem demands attention. Hume’s thesis 574
   that the mind can be identified with its contents seems implausible, if not nonsensical. 575
   A person is capable of performing a multitude of mental and emotional acts, from 576
   falling in love to thinking and getting excited, to cite but three activities. Does it make 577
   sense to suggest that it is the perceptions in each case that is falling in love, thinking, 578
   Hume on the Self
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   and getting excited? Surely people fall in love, think, and get excited, not the contents 579
   of their minds. It is not my perception that is in love but me. Certainly, when one 580
   engages in any of these acts the mind is in a particular state and a variety of mental 581
   activities can be identified and reported on. But to boldly imply that we accept that it 582
   is the contents of the mind, namely one’s perceptions, that is in love and not the 583
   person to whom these perceptions belong is nonsensical, if not false. The implication 584
   that it is not the person who possesses these perceptions, but that it is the collection of 585
   perceptions itself that is in love on the face of it seems absurd. 586
   The prospect that Hume’s bundle thesis is meaningless carries with it serious 587
   ramifications, not least of which is the suggestion that the search for evidence for 588
   the thesis is moot. But when Hume presents us with his bold thesis that the mind is its 589
   perceptions, he presents his view in a dramatic manner. His dogmatic claim 590
   broaches no compromising exceptions. As far as he is concerned, there is not 591
   a Scylla of a doubt that this account of the mind or self is correct and 592
   unassailable. What is more, he is adamant that we not be tempted by the 593
   possibility that there is anything more to the mind than its perceptions: the 594
   mind is its perceptions and only its perceptions. As he sees it, the thesis as it stands 595
   is true and by implication meaningful. So when he presents his theater analogy, he 596
   insists that we not weaken his thesis and possibly confuse matters with the consid- 597
   eration of what he implies would be extraneous questions. In particular, Hume 598
   advises us not to be tempted to speculate about the conceptual distinction between 599
   the mind and its contents: 600
   The comparison of the theater must not mislead us. They are the successive 6012
   perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion 603
   of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it 604
   is compos’d. (Treatise 253) 605
   This unqualified identification of the mind with its perceptions is categorical, or 6067
   absolute, as far as Hume is concerned. Clearly confident of his position here, Hume 608
   brooks absolutely no reservations about the thesis. As he sees it, there is no need for 609
   either conceptual or semantic refinements to his bold thesis. That is to say, we don’t 610
   require an understanding of the location of the mind to know what it is and the 611
   statements articulating this thesis can be presumed to be meaningful. But what 612
   accounts for Hume’s confidence in this identification of the mind with its content? 613
   More pointedly, what reasons does he provide us for adopting the assumption that his 614
   thesis on the self is conceptually self-contained and semantically sufficient? As I have 615
   suggested above, in Hume’s view there are distinct tactical reasons for the adoption 616
   of this controversial thesis. As I argued, perhaps the thesis ought to be seen as a 617
   heuristic device, possibly pregnant with instructive suggestions. With this pragmatic 618
   conception of a person, many of the intractable problems on the mind can now be 619
   reclassified as accessible problems about perceptions. But are there more substantial 620
   reasons for accepting the proposal that the mind is its perceptions? And do any of 621
   these reasons bear on either of the two concerns that I am raising here on the 622
   conceptual and semantic dimensions of the thesis? Given the longevity and perva- 623
   siveness of the traditional view of a person, this novel account of a person from Hume 624
   is most unlikely to win over many converts without convincing arguments. So what 625
   can be said in support of this fledgling philosophical thesis that might tempt the 626
   A. Schwerin
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   traditionalists to change their minds? And most important, has Hume provided us 627
   with any justification for his bold identity thesis on the mind? 628
   As it happens, Hume does provide us with empirical reasons for this identification, 629
   and as far as he is concerned, these reasons are sufficient to establish the viability of 630
   his view, both conceptually and semantically. As he sees it, his personal experiences 631
   confirm this (counterintuitive) thesis that identifies the mind with its perceptions. 632
   Furthermore, as he sees it, there is no end to the range and extent of the requisite 633
   evidence for this thesis. Early in the section “Of personal identity”, Hume commits 634
   himself to the ontology of perceptions, as we have seen. Having stressed the 635
   centrality of perceptions where the search for an understanding the self is concerned, 636
   Hume argues that if we possess a clear idea of the self we must possess a set of 637
   distinguishable and separate impressions, or perceptions. Now Hume assumes that he 638
   has a clear understanding of who he is. That is to say, he believes that the idea that he 639
   possess of himself is clear. But precisely who or what is the self that is David Hume? 640
   Intent on discovering who he is, Hume relies on an empirical investigation of himself 641
   that yields a report of his private explorations into the content of his mind that he 642
   shares with us in the Treatise that is interesting, and controversial. For when he 643
   explores himself to determine precisely who he is, he encounters perceptions and 644
   nothing else. The private mental world that he explores—reputedly his private mental 645
   world—apparently consists of perceptions, and only perceptions. He presents his 646
   empirical evidence in a dispassionate, straightforward manner: 647
   …when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on 6489
   some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 650
   hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a 651
   perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (Treatise 252) 652
   From Hume’s point of view, the perceptions that he encounters in his investigation 6534
   into himself are pervasive entities. Wherever he turns his attention he encounters 655
   perceptions. So much so, that he suggests that without them he would not exist. These 656
   perceptions constitute his very being. 657
   When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I 6589
   insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my 660
   perceptions remov’d by death, and cou’d I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor 661
   love , nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou’d be entirely annihilated, 662
   nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. 663
   (Treatise 252) 664
   So perceptions are fundamental to Hume’s existence: they appear to constitute the 6656
   essence of his existence. But they also constitute the foundation of his theory of the 667
   self. This is interesting in that perceptions are reputed to do double duty. On the one 668
   hand, from a philosophical point of view the perceptions that exist in abundance are 669
   important in that they provide the means for Hume to substantiate his controversial 670
   account of the self. For a philosopher intent on making his mark in the burgeoning 671
   science of human nature this is not an insignificant feat. On the other hand, and 672
   equally important, is the existential impact of the realization that perceptions are vital 673
   constituents of his being. Not only do perceptions serve as the means to verify his 674
   philosophical thesis on the self, they happen to constitute the very essence of his 675
   Hume on the Self
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   existence as a person.Without his perceptions he would neither be able to confirm his 676
   thesis on the self, and most importantly for him, he would not be in the position to 677
   determine that he is a person, with an identity, for he would not be. 678
   Here, we have the prime reasons for Hume’s decision to prioritize perceptions in 679
   his ontological scheme: his existence and his understanding of this existence are 680
   founded on his perceptions, as far as he is concerned. While access to perceptions 681
   makes it possible to solve many intellectual problems on the mind or self, and enables 682
   investigators to expand the new science of human nature it is their perceptions that 683
   sustain them in the first place. Without their invaluable perceptions individuals would 684
   cease to be persons.6 Well, as least as far as Hume’s understanding of himself is 685
   concerned: “nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non- 686
   entity.” (Treatise 252). Without his perceptions Hume would cease to be a person— 687
   and he reputably knows it.7 688
   From this, it follows that a great deal hinges on Hume’s identification of the mind 689
   with its perceptions. As controversial and counterintuitive as the thesis might prove to 690
   be, it now becomes apparent that from Hume’s perspective this is a thesis that is 691
   central to his conception of himself. However, its importance notwithstanding, 692
   additional questions about the justification for this question-begging thesis linger. 693
   Just as one would be reluctant to accept the suggestion that the washing machine—to 694
   return to my example—is its dirty clothes, so one would surely not willingly concede 695
   to the proposal that the mind can be identified with its perceptions? On the face of it, 696
   what appears to be Hume’s identification of the mind with its contents seems 697
   conceptually implausible and the thesis itself unintelligible, if not flagrantly false. 698
   Yet, a case can be made that the adoption of this identification has attractive practical 699
   consequences, and that the thesis, therefore, ought to be classified as intelligible, at 700
   least from a pragmatic point of view. Let us consider some of the practical benefits of 701
   this controversial proposal from Hume on the constitution of the mind or self in order 702
   to better appreciate the role that Hume has assigned for this thesis in his search for a 703
   viable account of the self. 704
   As we have seen, Hume is adamant that the mind itself—unlike its perceptions—is 705
   elusive: at least from a conceptual point of view, if not from an existential point of 706
   view. Apparently, we are unable to even conceive of the location of the mind’s 707
   perceptions, let alone able to isolate and separately study the mind in any direct 708
   manner. Hence, the bold unusual suggestion that the mind is its perceptions, thereby 709
   eliminating the need to search for the mysterious mind on its own. As counterintuitive 710
   as this suggestion might appear to be, the thesis that the mind is its perceptions has its 711
   merits. Some of the advantages of this strange thesis emerge from a consideration of 712
   the following example. As I type this paragraph, a Mr. Obama lives in the White 713
   House in Washington DC. Naturally, he happens to be the current president of the 714
   USA. So Mr. Obama is the current president of the USA: that is to say, he can be 715
   identified with the office holder of the highest political position in the USA. What is 716
   6 One is reminded of Berkeley’s doctrine from his Principles that to be is to be perceived: esse est percipi.
   7 But precisely where does this conception of himself come from? Surely not from his impressions? For this
   would appear to be circular: impressions would then be asked to both serve as the means to verify his thesis
   on the identification of the mind with its impressions and to serve as the source of his conception of
   himself. Something needs to be said by Hume on this important issue. Unfortunately, he appears to be silent
   on the issue.
   A. Schwerin
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   important is that knowledge of his residency in the White House is not necessary for 717
   our understanding of his presidency. All that is required is an understanding of his 718
   activities while serving as the president of the US. From our knowledge of Mr. 719
   Obama and his current activities, we can construct an understanding of his current 720
   standing in the US. That is to say, we can determine that he is the president and more 721
   importantly, develop an understanding of his presidency from this vantage point. And 722
   the more extensive and detailed our insight into his current activities, the deeper our 723
   understanding of his particular presidency will be. In short, to know about the nature 724
   of Obama’s presidency, it helps to know about his activities. No knowledge of the 725
   White House itself is called for. For all intents and purposes, the activities of Mr. 726
   Obama exhaustively determine the nature of his presidency. And if knowledge of the 727
   Obama presidency does not presuppose access to theWhite House the statements that 728
   we construct when reporting on this presidency will be meaningful even if they focus 729
   exclusively on the activities of the incumbent president. This seems to be Hume’s 730
   view where the mind is concerned. 731
   To know what the mind is. it is helpful to know how its contents operate: there is 732
   no need to know where the mind is located. If Hume is correct and we have not “the 733
   most distant notion of the place …or of the materials, of which it is compos’d”, we 734
   ought not to be bothered. In our efforts to understand what a person is, these turn out 735
   to be issues that need not concern us, as we have direct access to our perceptions and 736
   can directly perceive their diverse activities. And if knowledge of our perceptions can 737
   serve as an adequate basis of our understanding of the mind, the statements that we 738
   construct on the mind can be intelligible even if they refer exclusively to these 739
   perceptions. So the identification of the mind with its active perceptions, on the 740
   surface at least, appears to be one of expediency, enabling us to bypass both 741
   conceptual and existential obstacles that might otherwise constitute major impedi- 742
   ments in our research into a person. Most importantly for Hume, the adoption of this 743
   thesis enables the researcher into the self to scientifically test their understanding of 744
   the mind. In other words, the practical benefits of this thesis speak volumes for this 745
   approach to a problem than many had regarded as intractable. Equipped with this 746
   thesis, the scientist interested in human nature simply needs to follow the evidence 747
   wherever it leads: determine the nature of one’s perceptions and monitor their activity 748
   to construct a reliable scientific account of the mind. 749
   But is this move even necessary? The proposal that the mind is its perceptions, 750
   with the implication that investigators explore perceptual evidence in order to develop 751
   a reliable understanding of an individual’s mind can be shown to be moot. A strong 752
   argument can be made, as I shall demonstrate below, that there is no need for 753
   investigators to take any evidence into account when they attempt to assess Hume’s 754
   identification thesis on the mind. For an intrepid contributor adamant that the 755
   burgeoning science of human nature not contain “any principles which are not 756
   founded on [the] authority” of experience, this outcome could be embarrassing, if 757
   not downright devastating. (Treatise xviii) 758
   While it is a relatively straightforward matter to take stock of the different items in 759
   the mind, attempts to construct a plausible account of the mind itself are fraught with 760
   difficulties, as Hume has made plain in his analysis. While perceptions are scrutable, 761
   as we have seen, Hume’s view is that their location is beyond our reach. Unlike the 762
   washing machine—to return to my example yet again—where it presumably is a 763
   Hume on the Self
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   simple matter to determine the location of the machine, the mind proves to be more 764
   elusive. While both the contents of the washing machine and the machine itself are 765
   temporally and spatially determinate, and therefore conceivable or intelligible to 766
   anyone intent on learning about the machine and its contents, the mind proves not 767
   to be as accessible. Where the mind is concerned, according to Hume, the synchro- 768
   nicity between the mind and its contents breaks down: while perceptions are pre- 769
   sumed to be intelligible, by virtue of the fact that they are both temporally and 770
   presumably spatially determinate, the mind that is thought to contain these intelligible 771
   perceptions, while presumably temporally determinate, is not spatially determinate, 772
   and therefore unknowable. As Hume sees it, it is the lack of spatial determinateness 773
   that entails that the mind cannot be known.While temporally determinate, the mind is 774
   reputedly not spatially determinate. As he sees it, this entails that we do not possess 775
   even a distant notion to form the most rudimentary understanding of the mind. While 776
   we might have expected the mind to be as accessible and as comprehensible as its 777
   contents—its constantly changing perceptions are accessible both spatially and tem- 778
   porally, and thus knowable—there appears to be a significant disparity here, accord- 779
   ing to Hume. But if the self or mind is as inaccessible as Hume suggests it is, we are 780
   unable to determine with any confidence what the properties are of the referent of the 781
   term “self”. Not knowing what the mind or self is from any direct experience of it, we 782
   are resigned to speculating on its nature. Lacking even a most rudimentary under- 783
   standing of the mind, because we apparently do not possess “the most distant notion 784
   of the place” where our perceptions interact, we would not be able to recognize the 785
   mind had we to somehow encounter it in our investigations. That is to say, while the 786
   contents of the mind—i.e., its perceptions—presumably can be known and their 787
   properties determined, the mind or self remains a mystery, its properties apparently 788
   beyond our grasp. But if the properties of the self are as evasive as Hume implies they 789
   are, the attempt to establish an identity between the self and its perceptions is fraught 790
   with difficulties. For unless one can determine the properties of the extensions of both 791
   of the terms “perceptions” and “self”, one cannot determine the truth value of the 792
   statement asserting an identity between the referents of these terms. And a statement 793
   that is necessarily undecidable is surely to be viewed as scientifically useless, if not 794
   meaningless. So a great deal hinges on the problems generated by Hume’s claim that 795
   we do not possess “the most distant notion of the place” where our perceptions 796
   interact. Hume’s conception of the self will be seriously compromised unless these 797
   problems are dealt with adequately. Let us briefly explore this potential threat to 798
   Hume’s views on the self. 799
   Consider the following identity statement: Mia is Helen’s daughter. The two 800
   singular expressions “Mia” and “Helen’s daughter” happen to each have a referent: 801
   namely, a lovely, blue-eyed, young woman who is twenty-two years old. Had either 802
   of the singular expressions lacked a referent attempts to determine the truth-status of 803
   the identity sentence containing these expressions would fail, entailing that the 804
   identity statement is not verifiable.8 In this case, I suggest that it would be appropriate 805
   to classify the identity sentence that contains the two singular expressions “Mia” and 806
   8 It would not be verifiable at the moment, but had the singular expressions to acquire extensions in the
   future the identity statement would become verifiable then. In short, the identity statement is a contingent
   statement, dependent on the circumstances.
   A. Schwerin
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   “Helen’s daughter” as scientifically meaningless. Now, suppose that the identity 807
   sentence contains singular expressions that happen to refer to entities that for some 808
   reason we are unable to access. Perhaps we don’t know who Helen is and are 809
   therefore unable to determine whether or not Mia is Helen’s daughter. In this case, 810
   the failure to acquire knowledge of the referent of one of the singular expressions 811
   undermines our attempt to assess the truth-status of the identity sentence. But if 812
   knowledge of the referent is beyond our capabilities, so is knowledge of the proper- 813
   ties of that entity. In this case, we are precluded from knowing about the relationship 814
   between the referents of the two singular expressions, i.e., we are unable to determine 815
   that both singular expressions refer to the same entity.9 The inability to determine the 816
   nature or properties of the entity that is referred to by the singular expression “Helen’s 817
   daughter” therefore precludes us from determining the truth-status of the identity 818
   sentence “Mia is Helen’s daughter”.Without the necessary knowledge of the referent, 819
   this sentence must remain an undecidable sentence. And in this case, the sentence 820
   appears to be scientifically meaningless, and possibly useless: an outcome that clearly 821
   has important implications for Hume’s thesis on the mind. 822
   When Hume presents us with his views on the inscrutability of the mind, as he 823
   does with his theater analogy when he maintains that we do not possess “the most 824
   distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented”, he trades on the 825
   assumption that there actually is a place where our perceptions interact. Unfortunate- 826
   ly, as he sees it, this location must remain a mystery. That is to say, he assumes that 827
   there is a mind that contains the interacting perceptions. But if the place where our 828
   perceptions interact is as conceptually inaccessible as he suggests it is, our attempts to 829
   say anything significant about the mind must fail. Not knowing what the mind is 830
   prevents us from constructing meaningful statements on the mind. All of this suggests 831
   that Hume’s bold suggestion on the constitution of the mind that he made earlier in 832
   the section “Of personal identity” is equally problematic. That is to say, his identity 833
   thesis that we are “nothing but a bundle or collection of perceptions” appears to be 834
   meaningless. For this proposal appears to rest on the assumption that both of the 835
   singular terms in this thesis of identity have extensions that are knowable: a condition 836
   that is explicitly ruled out with his injunction against singular terms about the mind. 837
   Now, Hume clearly believes that his account of the self is not meaningless. Far 838
   from it. As he sees it, his thesis on the self has a meaning different to that traditionally 839
   ascribed to the theory of the self. After outlining his criticisms of his rivals’ view on 840
   the self, with their endorsement of an ontology committed to a mysterious constant 841
   substantial self, Hume concludes his critique on a telling note, suggesting that the 842
   idea of the self that does exist is not the same as that alluded to by his rivals: 843
   It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that 8445
   the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea. (Treatise 252, 846
   my emphasis) 847
   848
   It’s not that there is no idea of the self, but that “no such idea” of the self happens 849
   to exist. The strong suggestion here is that if there is an idea of the self, it is not the 850
   9 My argument here trades on what I believe is the traditional conception of identity provided to us by
   Leibniz. That is to say, X can be identified with Y if, and only if the properties of X are the same as the
   properties of Y.
   Hume on the Self
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   one that other philosophers thought existed. These remarks have misled many 851
   commentators, especially the final words in this conclusion that “there is no such 852
   idea”. Hume is not saying that there is no idea associated with the word “self”, but 853
   explicitly saying that the idea that his rivals assume does exist actually does not: that 854
   they are seriously mistaken in presupposing that there is an idea of a substantial self. 855
   As he sees it, the idea of a substantial unchanging self that his rivals are writing about 856
   cannot be generated by our impressions and it therefore does not exist: 857
   It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, the 8589
   idea of self is deriv’d…(Treatise 252) 860
   But does this negative response to the widespread view on the substantial 8612
   self entail anything positive? If so, what exactly can we infer from Hume’s 863
   critique here? In particular, can this criticism be construed as supporting the 864
   suggestion that there is another different idea for the term “self” for Hume, as I am 865
   proposing here? I think so. 866
   The conclusion that “no such idea” exists rests on Hume’s investigation of his 867
   dynamic impressions or perceptions. As he sees it, the careful exploration of these 868
   ever changing perceptions that “succeed each other, and never all exist at the same 869
   time” undermines the assumption endemic to the view of the self promoted by his 870
   rivals that there is an impression that does not change over time. There simply is no 871
   unchanging impression, constant over time. That is to say, the assumption that an 872
   impression exists that is “invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives” is 873
   not borne out by the perceptual evidence available to each one of us. (Treatise 251). 874
   In the light of this evidence, we are strongly encouraged to subscribe to a new view of 875
   the self according to which we are invited to accept the more circumspect view that if 876
   there actually is an idea associated with the term “self” it will necessarily differ 877
   significantly from that originally thought to be aligned with the term. While he does 878
   not do this, I shall refer to this tentative idea as Hume’s purported potential idea, or 879
   PPI, for short. This possible idea, the PPI that Hume is encouraging us to subscribe to, 880
   is reputed to be a composite idea, unlike the simple idea of an unchanging substantial 881
   self touted by his rivals. Adopting the view that all ideas are copies of prior 882
   impressions that caused them, Hume suggests that the proposal that an individual 883
   possesses a simple idea of an unchanging substantial self is unacceptable, and 884
   conflicts with the evidence that is readily available to each one of us. As he sees it, 885
   the realization that we are aware of the existence of many impressions or perceptions 886
   entails that the proposal from his rivals involves a “manifest contradiction and 887
   absurdity”. (Treatise 251). The cluster of different discrete constantly changing 888
   impressions cannot result in the production of a single unchanging idea of the self. 889
   To suggest otherwise is to negate the presumably more scientifically respectable view 890
   that each idea is produced by a preceding impression: a position sacrosanct to Hume. 891
   No, what is more likely to exist, if any idea of the self does exist, suggests Hume, is a 892
   composite idea of the self, each element of which has been produced by a separate 893
   impression. So the idea of the self, if there is one, is most likely to be a composite idea 894
   that has been generated by a stream of forever changing impressions. 895
   Nevertheless, there are some philosophers who will persist with their traditional 896
   view of the self. Hume acknowledges this. With a somewhat exasperated tone, he 897
   concludes that others might disagree with him on this score, insisting on the existence 898
   A. Schwerin
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   of a simple idea of an unchanging substantial self. This obstinacy has no counter, 899
   suggests Hume: 900
   If any one upon serious and unprejudic’d reflexion, thinks he has a different notion 9021
   of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, 903
   that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this 904
   particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu’d, which he 905
   call himself; tho’ I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Treatise 252) 906
   907
   Hume clearly has little patience with these unscientific thinkers: individuals he 908
   disparaging refers to as “some metaphysicians of this kind.” (Treatise 252). These 909
   obstinate thinkers from his point of view are beyond the pale, immune from his 910
   arguments, and presumably beyond the reach from any other reasonable approaches. 911
   As he laments, “I must confess I can reason no longer with him.” (Treatise 252). But 912
   is the adoption of Hume’s alternative idea, what I am calling his PPI, any less 913
   problematic than the endorsement of an account of the self that is committed to the 914
   existence of a substantial self? What reasons are there for assuming that speculations 915
   about the existence of a purported potential idea of the self are more reasonable than 916
   speculations on the existence of a mysterious substantial self? This is a question that I 917
   am not able to consider here. 918
   919
   References 920Q1
   1970 Philosophical Letters (Trans. Anthony Kenny) University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 921
   1978 Treatise of Human Nature (Ed. LA Selby-Bigge and PH Niddritch) Clarendon Press. Oxford 922
   2000 A Treatise of Human Nature (Edited by David Norton and Mary Norton) Oxford University Press, 923
   Oxford 924
   Bricke, John 1980 Hume’s Philosophy of Mind Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey 925
   Descartes, Rene 1969 Meditations on The First Philosophy (Trans. John Veatch) Open Court Publishing 926
   Co. La Salle, Illinois 927
   Fieser, James (Ed.) 2000 Early Responses to Hume’s Metaphysical and Epistemological Writings (Volumes 928
   Three and Four) Thoemmes Press, Bristol 929
   Harrison, Jonathan 1976 Hume’s Moral Epistemology Clarendon Press. Oxford 930
   Hume, David 1975 Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals 931
   (Ed. LA Selby-Bigge and PH Nidditch) Clarendon Press. Oxford 932
   Kruse, Vinding 1939 Hume’s Philosophy in his Principal Work A Treatise of Human Nature, and in his 933
   Essays (Trans. PT Federspiel) London 934
   Laird, John 1967 Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature Archon Books. London 935
   Locke, John 1850 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Troutman and Hayes, Philadelphia 936
   Mossner, Ernest 1948 “Philosophy and biography: the case of David Hume.” The Philosophical Review, 937
   Volume LIX 938
   Nagel, Thomas 1986 The View from Nowhere Oxford University Press, New York 939
   Parfit, Derek 1984 Reasons and Persons Oxford University Press, Oxford 940
   Pears, David 1990 Hume’s System: An Examination of the First Book of his Treatise Oxford University 941
   Press, New York 942
   Randall, John 1947 “David Hume: Radical Empiricist and Pragmatist.” In David Pears (ed.): David Hume: 943
   a Symposium. Macmillan, London 944
   Strawson, Peter 1979 Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics Methuen, London 945
   Stroud, Barry 1977 Hume Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 946
   Williams, Bernard 1973 Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956 – 1972 Cambridge University 947
   Press, London 948
   Winkler, Kenneth 2000 “All is revolution in us”: Personal identity in Shaftesbury and Hume Hume Studies 949
   Volume XXVI, Number 1, pp 3–40 950
   951
   Hume on the Self
   JrnlID 12133_ArtID 94_Proof# 1 – 10/02/2012
   AUTHOR’S PROOF
   UNCORRECTED PROOF
   AUTHOR QUERY
   AUTHOR PLEASE ANSWER QUERY.
   Q1. All references in the list were not cited in the body or text. Kindly
   provide citations for all references in the body.